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In the past decade, popular and medical opinions have coa-
lesced around the conclusion that breastfeeding an infant for at least
the first year of life,2 preferably to the exclusion of infant formula or
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1 There appears to be no standardized spelling for the act of breastfeeding, at least in legal
opinions. Various court decisions use "breast feeding." "breastfeeding" or "breast-feeding."
Additionally, medical experts do not seem to differentiate between the giving of breast milk
to an infant via the breast or via pumping expressed milk. This Comment will use the term
"breastfeeding," in accordance with the spelling chosen by La Leche League International
("LLLI"), and uses it to refer to both traditional nursing and the feeding of expressed breast
milk. See, e.g. LA LECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, All About La Leche League,
http://www.lli.org/ab.html?m=1 (last updated Apr. 26, 2010). This Comment also uses the
terms "nursing" and "breastfeeding" largely interchangeably, though "nursing" seems to be
more typically used to describe the act of feeding an infant from the breast itself. For a dis-
cussion of the potential inappropriateness of using the terms interchangeably in the legal
context, see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
2 See Am. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, Breastfeeding and the Use ofJHuman Milk, 115 PEDIATRICS
496,499 (2005), available at
http:/aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/full /pediatrics;1 15/2/496.pdf ("Breastfeeding
should be continued for at least the first year of life and beyond for as long as mutually de-
sired by mother and child."); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., A55/15, Promoting Appropri-
ate Feeding for Infants and Young Children, GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR INFANT AND YOUNG
CHILD FEEDING 5 110 (April 16.2002), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf files/WHA55/ea5515.pdf ("As a global public health rec-
ommendation, infants should be exclusively breastfed for the first six months of life to
achieve optimal growth. development and health. Thereafter, to meet their evolving nutri-
tional requirements, infants should receive nutritionally adequate and safe complementary
foods while breastfeeding continues for up to two years of age or beyond. Exclusive breast-
feeding from birth is possible except for a few medical conditions, and unrestricted exclusive
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other breast milk substitutes for at least six months, 3 is the normal,
optimal infant feeding decision. 4 Breast milk substitutes expose in-
5 6fants to higher risks of immune deficiency, disease, and illness. As
the optimal food for infants, breast milk is easier to digest,7 adapts to
breastfeeding results in ample milk production."). The WHO claim is based on both health
and sustainable development concerns. Id.
' Am. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS. supra note 2, at 498. ("The AAP Section on Breastfeeding.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. American Academy of Family Physi-
cians, Academy of Breastfeeding Medicine. World Health Organization. United Nations
Children's Fund, and many other health organizations recommend exclusive breastfeeding
for the first 6 months of life. Exclusive breastfeeding is defined as an infant's consumption of
human milk with no supplementation of any type (no water, no juice, no nonhuman milk,
and no foods) except for vitamins, minerals, and medications. Exclusive breastfeeding has
been shown to provide improved protection against many diseases and to increase the like-
lihood of continued breastfeeding for at least the first year of life.").
4 Id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., Breastfeeding (2010).
http://www.who.int/topics/breastfeeding/en/ ("Breastfeeding is the normal way of providing
young infants with the nutrients they need for healthy growth and development."); U.S.
BREASTFEEDING COMM., BREASTFEEDING IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL AGENDA 7
(2001), available at
http://www.usbreastfeeding.org/LinkClick.aspx?link=Publications/National-Agenda-200 1-
USBC.pdf ("All U.S. mothers should have the opportunity to breastfeed their infants and all
infants should have the opportunity to be breastfed. By ensuring access to comprehensive,
interdisciplinary, culturally appropriate lactation and breastfeeding care and services from
preconception through weaning. all women will be empowered to breastfeed their infants
exclusively for about 6 months and continue through the first year of life and beyond while
introducing appropriate weaning foods.").
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, WHY
BREASTFEEDING IS IMPORTANT (2010), http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/why-
breastfeeding-is-important/ ("The cells, hormones, and antibodies in breast milk protect ba-
bies from illness. This protection is unique; formula cannot match the chemical makeup of
human breast milk.").
6 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. OFFICE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH. NATIONAL
BREASTFEEDING CAMPAIGN (2010).
http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/government-programs/national-breastfeeding-
campaign/ ("[B]abies who are exclusively breastfed for six months are less likely to develop
ear infections, diarrhea, respiratory illnesses, and may be less likely to develop childhood
obesity.").
7 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5 ("For most babies-especially pre-
mature babies-breast milk is easier to digest than formula. The proteins in formula are
made from cow's milk and it takes time for babies' stomachs to adjust to digesting them.")
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changing nutritional needs,8 and is especially important for new-
borns9 and premature babies.10 Additionally, breastfeeding advocates
argue that, for nursing mothers, breastfeeding is easier, 1 safer,12
cheaper,13 protects against maternal disease,14 and aids in infant-
mother bonding.' 5
8 Id. ("[B]reast milk changes as your baby grows-Colostrum changes into what is called
mature milk. By the third to fifth day after birth, this mature breast milk has just the right
amount of fat, sugar, water, and protein to help your baby continue to grow. It is a thinner
type of milk than colostrum, but it provides all of the nutrients and antibodies your baby
needs.").
9 Id. ("[C]olostrum ... is the thick yellow first breast milk [occurring] during pregnancy and
just after birth. This milk is very rich in nutrients and antibodies to protect your baby. Al-
though your baby only gets a small amount of colostrum at each feeding, it matches the
amount his or her tiny stomach can hold.")
10 Id
" Id (detailing the lack of need to sterilize bottles, or measure and mix infant formula).
12 See Risks of Informal Breastmilk Sharing Versus Formula Feeding, PHD IN PARENTING
(Nov. 28, 2010). http://www.phdinparenting.com/2010/11/28/risks-of-informal-breastmilk-
sharing-versus-formula-feeding/ (outlining the risks of poorly mixed formula, usually as a
result of poor water supplies, factory contamination, and formula tampering).
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., supra note 5 ("Formula and feeding supplies can
cost well over $1,500 each year, depending on how much your baby eats. Breastfed babies
are also sick less often, which can lower health care costs."); See also id. ("The nation bene-
fits overall when mothers breastfeed. Recent research shows that if 90 percent of families
breastfed exclusively for 6 months, nearly 1,000 deaths among infants could be prevented.
The United States would also save $13 billion per year - medical care costs are lower for
fully breastfed infants than never-breastfed infants. Breastfed infants typically need fewer
sick care visits, prescriptions, and hospitalizations.").
14 CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION. Does Breastfeeding Reduce the Risk ofPe-
diatric Overweight? Div. OF NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY: RESEARCH TO PRACTICE
SERIES No. 4,1 (2007)
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/nutrition/pdf/breastfedding r2p.pdf("For mothers, bene-
fits of breastfeeding include decreased risk of breast and ovarian cancer, and type 2 di-
abetes."): LA LECHE LEAGUE INT'L, Good for Moms Too, NEW BEGINNINGS 46, 46 (Nov. 11,
2009) available at http://www.1lli.org/NB/NBMarAprO9p46.html ("Scientists ... found that
women who breastfeed for more than a year are 10% less likely to develop heart conditions
than those who do not. Breastfeeding was also found to reduce the risk of high blood pres-
sure by 12% and diabetes and high cholesterol by around 20%.").
15 Betsy Liotus, Afore than Milk, NEW BEGINNINGS 36, 36-39 (1996), available at
http://www.lli.org/NB/NBMarApr96p36.html ("Experts estimate that nearly 90% of the
communication that takes place between people is nonverbal. Breastfeeding is an excellent
example. The act of breastfeeding 'speaks' volumes to a baby in a language he or she most
readily understands. The sensory stimulation that's part of the close, skin-to-skin contact that
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Despite these conclusions, American breastfeeding rates re-
main dismal; while hospitals report that upwards of 70% of women
express the intention to breastfeed and attempt to do so in the hospital
setting, the rate of exclusive breastfeeding for 6-month-old infants
hovers around 18%.16 Many scholars and experts have investigated
the contradictory stances that American doctors and policy-makers
seem to take in regards to nursing: explicit-sometimes forceful' 7
advocacy in favor of breastfeeding on the one hand, contrasted with
meager support for continuation in the face of medical, employment
or other obstacles on the other.' 8
breastfeeding requires translates into a feeling of acceptance that is a baby's first lesson in
self-esteem.").
16 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 2. at 498 (detailing dismal retention rates for exclu-
sive breastfeeding, despite promotional campaigns).
1 There is much concern over perceived "pushiness" on the part of breastfeeding advocates.
See, e.g., Hanna Rosin, The Case Against Breastfeeding, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2009, at 64,66
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/the-case-against-
breastfeeding/7311/ (disputing scientific claims about the benefits of breastfeeding and refer-
ring to advocates as "breast-feeding fascist[s]" who rely on guilt to pressure time-pressed
women into thinking breastfeeding is the only legitimate option in the face of actual and per-
ceived difficulties): cf The Case Against Breastfeeding: The Voices, PHD IN PARENTING
(Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.phdinparenting.com/2009/03/18/the-case-against-breastfeeding-
the-voices/ (highlighting a series of responses to the article, disputing both the scientific
claims and accusations of "pushy lactivists," and also discussing hurdles to breastfeeding
and inadequate support).
" See, e.g., Elita Kalma. Should Black Women Feel Guilty for Not Breastfeeding?,
BLACKTATING (Dec. 17, 2010, 11:54 AM). http://www.blacktating.com/2010/12/should-
black-women-feel-guilty-for-not.html (describing obstacles faced by black women as a result
of poverty and working conditions that may inhibit breastfeeding); Jake Aryeh Marcus,
Pumping 9 to 5, MOTHERING (2008), available at
http://www.mothering.com/breastfeeding/pumping-9-to-5 ("No federal law establishes or
protects a right to pump breastmilk in the workplace. Although 15 states have statutes con-
cerning the practice .. ., these laws vary widely in what they require employers to do to ac-
commodate employees who express breastmilk. and some don't require employers to do any-
thing at all."); Common Breastfeeding Concerns. KELLYMOM: BREASTFEEDING &
BREASTFEEDING IN CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
Breastfeeding in custody disputes-whether between divorc-
ing or separating parents or between a state seeking to revoke a bio-
logical parent's custody 9 -tracks this ambivalence. Since the de-
cline of the tender years doctrine, 20 judges espouse the importance of
breastfeeding and defer to parental autonomy on one hand while im-
posing deadlines and invoking personal preferences on the appropri-
ate duration of breastfeeding on the other. 21 This occurs partially be-
cause breastfeeding in custody determinations represents a particular
moment at which different infant feeding interests may conflict, al-
lowing historical assumptions about appropriate parenting roles to in-
PARENTING, http://www.kellymom.com/bf/concerns/index.html (last visited Nov. 15. 2011)
(outlining a variety of medical and other issues that women and babies may encounter during
breastfeeding).
19 It is at least theoretically possible for non-biological parents, both mothers and fathers, to
breastfeed. See Jan Barger, Can Men Breastfeed?, BABYCENTER,
http://www.babycenter.com/404 can-men-breastfeed 8824.bc (last visited Nov. 15, 2011);
Can IBreastfeed My Adopted Baby?, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT'L, (last modified Jul. 20, 2011,
5:44 PM) http://www.1lli.org/FAQ/adopt.html. However, I have not come across a case or
discussion that explicitly references a breastfeeding relationship established in this manner.
except for instances involving lesbian parents who have infants simultaneously and nurse
infants birthed by both mothers. See, e.g., Paula Roach, Parent-Child Relationship Trumps
Biology: California's Definition of Parent in the Context of Same-Sex Relationships, 43 CAL.
W. L. REv. 235, 256 (2006) (discussing same-sex relationships involving breastfeeding non-
biological children). Thus, when discussing a person engaged in a breastfeeding relationship,
this Comment assumes that the typical situation involves a breastfeeding mother nursing a
biological child unless stated otherwise.
20 Alexandra Selfridge. Equal Protections and Gender Preference in Divorce Contests over
Custody, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 166-67 (2007): see also John G. Taussig Jr. &
John T. Carpenter IV. Joint Custody. 56 N.D.L. REV. 223, 225-27 (1980).
21 See Elizabeth N. Baldwin, Extended Breastfeeding and the Law, 20 BREASTFEEDING
ABSTRACTS 19, 19-20 (2001) http://www.lalecheleasgue.org/ba/feb01.html; Elizabeth N.
Baldwin, Breastfeeding and Divorce, LA LECHE LEAUGE INT'L (Aug. 2, 2006, 11:38 pm),
http://www.lalecheleague.org/law/lawdivorce.hmtl; Melissa R. Vance, Breastfeeding Legis-
lation in the United States: A General Overview and Implications for Helping Mothers, 41
LEAVEN 51, 51-54 (2005). http://www.1lli.org/1lleaderweb/lv/lvjunjul05p51.html.
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fuse hard choices. When two parents with theoretically equal claims
to parent are in conflict, the time investment involved in breastfeed-
ing, especially exclusively, may undermine the presumption of joint
custody. 22 The idea that breastfeeding is best collides with assump-
tions about appropriate behavior while nursing. 23 The primacy of pa-
rental autonomy in feeding decisions clashes with state intervention
into the lives of "failed" families, and allows judicial discretion about
the "best interest of the child" when both parents have an equal
-24
claim.
This Comment contends that cultural and legal representa-
tions of breastfeeding in custody determinations highlight contradic-
tory notions of motherhood and family that mirror liberal and con-
servative family traditions thought to be long dead. Judicial
determinations involving a breastfeeding relationship often reinforce
narratives of marriage, parenthood, and their respective roles for
women in a way that comports with the gender-specific "tender
22 See Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 335.
360-64 (1982).
23 See infra Part III.
24 Cf MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH- CENTURY AMERICA 248 (1985) ("Courts applied judicially created standards of
child welfare and parental fitness in order to take the ultimate decision of child placement
out of the hands of both parents."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History
of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 300 (2002) (describing a
second legal tradition marked by massive legal intervention into the parental relation des-
pites an extreme deference to parental prerogatives and a reluctance to intervene).
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years" doctrine25 and the notion of parental autonomy as a way of
privatizing dependency. In the case of custody disputes involving
two parents, breastfeeding may act a tiebreaker in favor of complete
maternal custody; it may also be disregarded as evidence of inappro-
priate maternal behavior. Both of these determinations can be read as
consistent with the tender years doctrine rather than its repudiation.26
In cases where the state seeks to revoke custody based in part on ma-
ternal behavior while breastfeeding, such as alcohol or drug use, or
failure to supplement with infant formula, such custody determina-
tions mirror efforts to privatize dependency and then punish women
who fail to meet the imposed standards. 27
Common law coverture and the tender years doctrine have
both been widely discredited as violating the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and advancing archaic notions of the
proper role of women in family and public life. 28 This Comment
shows that the treatment of breastfeeding in custody disputes demon-
strates that such pronouncements may be premature. Furthermore, it
25 Cf GROSSBERG, supra note 24. at 248 ("The 'tender years' rule is an apt. illustration of the
growing body of rules devised by the courts to enhance their new powers. It decreed that in-
fants ... should be placed in a mother's care unless she was proven unworthy of the respon-
sibility.").
26 See infra Part II.
27 See infra Part 111.
28 See infra Part 1.
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explores the contradictory ways in which the history of family law in
the conservative and liberal traditions continues to influence the out-
come of cases. Scientific proof of the benefits of breastfeeding may
be largely indisputable, especially in situations where the mother
wishes to do so. 29 This Comment argues that courts should follow a
doctrine that is based on the presumption of the benefits of breast-
feeding when desired by the mother, and seeks to accommodate such
desires without resort to stereotyping and judgment. Part I surveys
common law coverture, conservative and liberal family traditions, the
tender years doctrine, parental autonomy and the privatization of de-
pendency, and the relation to modem custody disputes involving
breastfeeding. Part II examines the effect of the tender years doctrine
on custody disputes involving breastfeeding when parents have valid
claims to custody under a "best interest of the child" standard and ar-
gues that seemingly contradictory determinations in fact both rein-
force appropriate gender roles for women-as-mothers under the ten-
der years doctrine. Part III investigates the relationship between
29 No arguments have been made in favor of compelled breastfeeding, which is beyond the
scope of this Comment. In addition, it is clear that the choice to breastfeed resides with the
mother, insofar as no court would enforce a contractual agreement between spouses wherein
the husband agreed to pay the mother to breastfeed for a specified duration. See Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Modelfor State Policy, 70 CAL.
L. REv. 204, 231 (1983) ("[C]ourts have refused to enforce such agreements between spous-
es as: payment by one spouse to another for domestic, child care, or other services in the
home.").
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parental autonomy, the privatization of dependency, and judicially
determined inappropriate maternal breastfeeding relationships, and
argues the juxtaposition between normally deferential court standards
of parental autonomy and intervention into the lives of women more
subject to state intervention highlights the contradictory nature of
family law. Part IV proposes that courts acknowledge breastfeeding
as the normal and optimal feeding decision for infants and support
that choice without relying on common law coverture, state interven-
tion, or tender years justifications. The Comment concludes that it
may not be possible to sever historical justifications for custody dis-
putes involving the family and the role of women, but attempting to
do so would be preferable than continuing down the path set by cur-
rent legal standards.
I. COMMON LAW COVERTURE, CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL FAMILY
TRADITIONS, THE TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE, PARENTAL AUTONOMY AND
THE PRIVATIZATION OF DEPENDENCY, AND MODERN CUSTODY DISPUTES
Modem family law arises out of a conservative and liberal
family tradition premised upon hierarchical family relationships be-
tween husbands, wives, and children. 30 This Part outlines three dif-
30 See MARY BETH NORTON. FouNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE
FoRMiNG OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 57 (1996).
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ferent aspects of historical family law: the conservative tradition of
hierarchical family as manifested in common law coverture and the
liberal tradition's modification of separate spheres, the assumption of
parental autonomy as a mechanism for privatizing dependency, and
the tender years doctrine as modification of both.
A. Common Law Coverture and Conservative and Liberal Family
Traditions
The conservative family tradition considers the nuclear family
as a microcosm of the state, with its hierarchy positioning the Hus-
band at the top. 3 1 As Locke noted, "the Husband and Wife, though
they have but one common Concern, yet having different understand-
ing, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore
being necessary, that the last Determination, i.e. the Rule, should be
placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the abler
and the stronger."32 In the conservative tradition, women belong in
the private sphere of the home while men belong in the public sphere
3 See id. at 58-59 ("Whether they focused primarily on politics or chiefly on the family, ear-
ly modern Anglo-American theorists concurred on three key points: hierarchy was necessary
to the operations of the household; the proper director of the family's activities was its hus-
band/father/master; and the subordination of wife to husband was the foundation of the fami-
ly unit and thus of society itself.").
32 JOHN LOCKE, Essay Concerning the Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 226 (1698).
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of everywhere else. 33 This is coextensive with the common law doc-
trine of coverture. 34 According to Blackstone: "By marriage, the
husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or le-
gal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing." 35
The rise of the Liberal tradition continued the hierarchical di-
vision of labor, albeit in a somewhat modified fashion:
The liberal tradition, despite its supposed foundation of individual rights and
human equality, is more Aristotelian in this respect than is generally acknowl-
edged. In one way or another, almost all liberal theorists have assumed that the
'individual' who is Ie basic subject of the theories is the male head of a pa-
triarchal household.
Additionally, the liberal tradition reinforces the public/private divide
discussed above via invocation of the "cult of domesticity" present in
Nineteenth century America, which associated women with the do-
E MICHAEL WALZER. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 240
(1983) ("The real domination of women has less to do with their familial place than with
their exclusion from all other places. They have been denied the freedom of the city, cut off
from distributive processes and social goods outside the sphere of kinship and love.").
3 See infra notes 35 and 37, and accompanying text.
35 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421, 422; See also Marylynn Salmon, Equality
or Submersion?: Feme Covert Status in Early Pennsylvania, in WOMEN OF AMERICA: A
HISTORY 92, 94 (Carol Berkin & Mary Beth Norton eds.. 1979).
36 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 14 (1989).
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mestic both because of their proper place and because of a natural in-
clination towards nurturing.37
B. Parental Autonomy and the Privatization of Dependency
If liberal and conservative traditions define a proper family as
one predicated on hierarchy, one reason for such hierarchy is the
state's preference for the privatization of dependency.38 Children be-
37 See GROSSBERG, supra note 24. at 209 (discussing the ways in which the "cult of domes-
ticity in nineteenth century America "thoroughly and single-mindedly linked women with
domesticity" and "confused womanhood with motherhood").
38 For an explanation of this term, see Brenda Crossman, Contesting Conservat-
isms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 415, 416 n. 1 (2005) ("This process of restructuring and retracting
the Keynesian welfare state has been extensively documented, although variously
labeled within the literature. Compare PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE
WELFARE STATE?: REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 17
(1994) (describing restructuring as the politics of retrenchment, which the author
defines as "policy changes that either cut social expenditure, restructure welfare
state programs to conform more closely to the residual welfare state model, or alter
the political environment in ways that enhance the probability of such outcomes in
the future") with NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFOMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE
SILENT SURRENDER OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 45 (2002) (describing a similar re-
structuring process as a shift from a largely social democratic state to a more mar-
ket oriented body, which the author calls "the enabling state"). He describes the
enabling state as involving an increased emphasis on the private delivery of public
goods and "less emphasis on providing income support to people out of work than
does the welfare state and more weight on fostering social inclusion, mainly
through active participation in the labor force." Id. Others have described this
process of restructuring as privatization. See, e.g., STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH AND
MICHAEL LIPSKY,NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF
CONTRACTING 188 (1993) (describing privatization as "a broad policy impulse
which seeks to change the balance between public and private responsibility in
public policy"); PRIVATIZATION, LAW, AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 4 (Bren-
da Cossman & Judy Fudge eds., 2002) (describing privatization as capturing "the
process of transition from welfare state to neo-liberal state as the material base
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long (as property) to the father, who has the right and obligation to
raise and train them for future citizenship, at least (originally) with
respect to legitimate children.39 Under this vision, "the interests of
children were [presumed] best protected by making the father the
natural guardian and by using a property-based standard of parental
fitness." 40
Parental autonomy is the rule, and a parent (read: father) has
the duty and obligation to raise children with almost no intervention
from outside state forces:
In Blackstone's apt phrase, children lived in "the empire of the father" until
they reached twenty-one. A father enjoyed virtually unlimited control over the
custody of his minor legitimate children and was also free to determine who
would serve as his children's guardian in the case of his death, unconstrained by
any obligation to select the children's mother, for instance, or another relative.
Blackstone's description of the right of correction, operating on similar prin-
ciples, noted that a father had to act "in a reasonable manner," but left the exact
location of this limit unclear. Blackstone endorsed correction for the purpose of
securing obedience; the only behavior he actu~jly declared unreasonable was
intentionally killing a child for insubordination.
This rule, however, is accompanied by a converse willingness to in-
tervene in the lives of "failed" families, "often evincing a radical sus-
picion of parental autonomy and an eager willingness to reshape fam-
upon which the Keynesian compromise rested has been undermined and its mode
of governance transformed").").
3 GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 235.
40 id
4 Hasday, supra note 24. at 90 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *434, 440-
41 (1698)).
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ily relations." 42 One primary manifestation of the state inclination to
"routinely scrutinize the familial relations of [welfare] recipients,
doubt parental judgment, and undercut familial autonomy" when a
family requires assistance from the state or is otherwise considered
failed.43 However, this interference also extends to the creation of
"suitable home rules" that may influence the government's ability to
rescind custody from poor mothers in situations where interference
would not occur but for dependence on public resources.44
C. The Emergence and Decline of the Tender Years Doctrine
As a result of the rise of the liberal idea of separate spheres, a
preference for maternal care in children emerged, first for illegitimate
children but then as part of a larger move towards a "nurture-based
definition of child welfare." 45 This rise modified the assumption of
patriarchal control of children as described previously, at least for in-
fants and young children.46 Playing off of English common law's
"ambiguous status" surrounding the custody of illegitimate children,
state courts in Massachusetts and then New York began awarding
42 Hasday, supra note 24, at 300.
43 Id. at 300-301.
44 Id. at 362-63.
45 GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 234.
46 Id. at 238.
2012] BREASTFEEDING IN CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 641
custody of such children to mothers, justified both on lineage and
welfare grounds. 47 The New York court's determination "cemented
an identification of maternal legal rights with child welfare and judi-
cial discretion that remained intact for much of the rest of the cen-
tury" and was largely adopted by state courts throughout the United
States.48
What started as a custody award in cases of illegitimate child-
ren, 49 however, portended a larger shift in the role of parenting, child-
ren, and appropriate roles. The tender years doctrine, then, arose out
of "Victorian gender commitments" and dictated that "infants, child-
ren below puberty, and youngsters afflicted with serious ailments
should be placed in a mother's care unless she was proven unworthy
of the responsibility."50 Under such a rule, women had a presumptive
right "to the custody of children in need of maternal nurture."51 This
rule was a "double-edged sword for women," however, since children
in need of a "masculine" home environment, such as older boys,
could and were placed with their fathers instead. 52 This presumptive
47 Id. at 207-08.
48 GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 208-209.
49 Id. at 207-09.
50 Id. at 248.
5 Id. at 249.
52 Id.
642 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XV:3
rule largely controlled family law custody disputes for more than a
century. 53 The doctrine also contains two relevant assumptions: first,
the presumption of fitness on the part of the mother, largely assumed
in a legal framework of strong parental rights (which would be most
relevant in a situation where a parent is in conflict with the state over
custody); and second, the presumption of fitness on the part of the
mother in relation to the father, assumed under the doctrine of tender
years and Victorian notions of appropriate gender divisions (which
would be relevant in a situation where two parents are in conflict with
each other over custody and each otherwise has a strong presumption
of custody against the state).54
Under modern family law doctrine, the tender years doctrine
is largely considered to be abolished, "denounced as antiquated,
wrongheaded, and dysfunctional in our enlightened new age of gend-
er equality."55 Courts and legislatures across the United States "have
eliminated gender-preference provisions from their divorce-custody
5 Klaff. supra note 22. at 335.
54 Id.; see GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 249; see Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child?
Custody, Guardianship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Ninteeth-Century America,
9 FEMINIST STUDIES 235, 235 (1983).
5 Selfridge, supra note 20, at 167 (describing contemporary attitudes); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (deciding custody on the basis of sex is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); ef Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268. 283 (1979) (denounc-
ing the gender bias of unconstitutional alimony statutes as perpetuating gender stereotypes).
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statutes." 56 The tender years doctrine has been replaced in all juris-
dictions by a "best interest of the child" standard that places children
in the place most likely to facilitate their welfare, untethered from the
traditional assumption that such a place is necessarily with a child's
mother. 5 However, commentators have noted that, despite statutory
prohibitions and frequent claims to implement gender-neutral stan-
dards,58 "the application of the 'best interests' standard is very likely
to be biased in the mother's favor. Thus, the general 'best interests'
standard in operation may not truly be gender neutral." 59 The next
Part will discuss the way that traces of the tender years doctrine and
its ties to liberal and conservative notions of appropriately gendered
parenting influence outcomes in custody disputes involving a breast-
feeding mother.
56 Selfridge. supra note 20, at 169. 169 n. 15.
57 Id. at 169-70; see UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1971 and 1973). 9A
U.L.S. 282 (1998).
5 See UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1971 and 1973), 9A U.L.S. 282
(1998); see, e.g. Mich. Comp. Laws. Serv. §722.23 (LexisNexis 2011) (espousing in the spi-
rit of the UMDA, a 12-factor list to be "considered, evaluated, and determined by the court"
in making custody decisions).
59 Selfridge, supra note 20. at 171-72.
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II. BREASTFEEDING AS CONFLICT IN CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEEN
EQUALLY SITUATED PARENTS: "THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD" AS
TENDER YEARS IN DISGUISE
Breastfeeding is one factor that may play into the "best inter-
est of the child" at stake in a custody dispute, and one that has arisen
only recently. 60 The rise of such a factor in custody disputes is large-
ly attributable to two phenomena.61 First, previous regimes of di-
vorce laws and the tender years doctrine rendered breastfeeding irre-
levant.62 In relation to divorce laws,"[p]rior to the advent of no-fault
divorce in the 1970s, breastfeeding was not a relevant consideration
in most child custody disputes," which instead analyzed fault. 63 The
tender years doctrine's presumption of female custody also made in-
vestigation into the breastfeeding relationship unnecessary.64
Second, breastfeeding simply was not popular: "[w]arned of the dire
consequences of contaminants in breast milk if they did not wean
right away, an entire generation of mothers stopped breastfeeding
6o Mark Momjian, Winning the Weaning War: Breastfeeding as a Factor in Child Custody
Litigation, 8 AM. J. FAM. LAW 135, 135-36 (1994).
61 See id. at 135; Kristen D. Hofheimer, Breastfeeding as a Factor in Child Custody and Vi-
sitation Decisions. 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 433. 433 (1998).
62 Mormjian. supra note 60, at 135.
6 Id.; Jana B. Singer, The Privatization ofFamily Law, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1443, 1470-71
(1992) (explaining American jurisprudence prior to the 1970s that required the spouse filing
for divorce to show his or her partner was guilty of marital fault).
64 Kristen D. Hotheimer, supra note 61, at 433 ("Over the past decade, breastfeeding has sur-
faced as an increasingly common issue in child custody and visitation litigation. This devel-
opment is partially due to the abolition of the tender years doctrine, under which judges al-
ways awarded custody of a breastfeeding child to the mother unless she were shown to be
unfit.").
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their children during the baby boom era." 65 In the 1990s, however,
campaigns to increase breastfeeding rates and increased scientific un-
derstanding of breast milk as optimal human infant nutrition meant
that "trial courts [were] increasingly being asked to determine wheth-
er an infant's breastfeeding schedule affect[ed] custody or visitation
rights." 66 Thus, breastfeeding is an instance where a previously irre-
levant factor entered judicial decision-making after the supposed end
to the tender years doctrine and after the rise of sex-neutral parenting
determinations.67 As such, it represents a mechanism through which
to analyze the prevalence of such argumentation.
This Part proceeds by first discussing the way that courts have
dealt with breastfeeding in the context of custody disputes centered
on joint custody and shared parenting. It argues that judicial deci-
sion-making in this arena reinforces assumptions of the tender years
doctrine in two separate ways. First, it reinforces the notion that
women are the appropriate caregivers for infants and children who
are nursing and ties that appropriate caregiving relationship to biolo-
gy and maternal instinct. Second, it notes that even cases that deny
65 Momjian, supra note 60, at 135.66 Id. at 135 36.
67 Id. at 138.
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deference to a nursing mother do so based on justifications of proper
maternal conduct consistent with the tender years tradition.
A. Custody Decisions Granting Sole Breastfeeding Determinations to the
Mother
Many recent cases use breastfeeding as justification to grant
sole custody to a mother nursing an infant.68 The most famous early
case in this genre is Norton v. Norton, in which the Colorado Court of
Appeals upheld a grant of custody to the mother on the grounds that
the mother was breastfeeding her child. 69 The court noted that the
custody order could be modified as the child grew older, and deemed
the father's sex discrimination claim frivolous for even suggesting
that granting custody based on breastfeeding was a sex-linked deci-
sion.70 Cases that grant custody largely follow this pattern: judges
grant exclusive or near-exclusive custody to the mother, and then
qualify the grant with a time period after which the decision may be
68 Ford v. Ford, 700 P.2d 65, 66 (Idaho 1982) (originally holding that custody of the child
should go to the breastfeeding mother as the continuation of breastfeeding would be in the
child's best interest); In re the Marriage of Love. 511 N.W.2d 648, 648-49 (Iowa Ct. App.
1993) (finding, at the district court level, that father should receive custody, but that transfer
of custody of his breastfeeding daughter would be postponed until she was weaned): Friend-
shuh v. Headlough, 504 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1993) (awarding custody to the mother until
age two, after expressing concern about the mother's interest in breastfeeding indefinitely);
see Momjian, supra note 60, at 136-38 (discussing the implications of these cases in the
breastfeeding context).
69 In re the Marriage of Norton, 640 P.2d 254, 254-55 (Colo. App. 1982).
70 Id.; see Montjian, supra note 60. at 136 (describing popular backlash to the opinion on the
national level).
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reconsidered. 7' These recent cases seem to consider a breastfeeding
relationship as relevant to the awarding or rescinding of custody or
visitation schedules in two ways: one, as evidence of an ongoing at-
tachment or relationship investment that one parent has put into
maintaining contact with an infant,72 and two, as a parental (read:
maternal) decision that deserves deference, at least until a certain
73age.
Thus, one plausible reading of these cases is as a limited revi-
talization of the tender years doctrine for breastfeeding mothers. 74
Instead of the historical version of tender years, which limited the
doctrine's application generally to those "children in need of mater-
nal nurture," courts may define maternal nurture specifically as
breastfeeding itself and the doctrine becomes limited by the end of
that relationship, i.e., weaning.76 Thus, breastfeeding redefines what
71 See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 2008 WL 2152277, at *1, *4 (Ky. Ct. App. May 23, 2008).
72 See, e.g., Buccini v. Sonara, 989 So.2d 1288, 1289-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that despite father's concern that mother will breastfeed indefinitely to deny father unsuper-
vised visits, father will not have unsupervised custody until the doctor determines the child
can safely take a bottle).
7 See, e.g., Widdel v. Kannegieter, 779 N.W.2d 79. 2009 WL 5124774, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2009).
74 It is possible that the doctrine was dead but has now been revitalized. See Hotheimer, su-
pra note 61, at 459 (detailing cases from the early 1990s that allow lengthy visitation despite
the presence of a breastfeeding relationship in young infants). These cases may limit the re-
vitalized doctrine of tender years not only in length (as discussed) but also in scope, but do
not undermine the central thesis of this Comment.
7 See GROSSBERG. supra note 24, at 249.
See, e.g., Widdel v. Kannegieter, 2009 WL 5125774, at *4 (determining that two
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constitutes a tender year as including those behaviors which can only
be performed by mothers, but does not challenge that the breastfeed-
ing relationship itself is controlled by mothers and is an area in which
the court should defer to the mother's judgment. 77
It is not surprising, then, that a large portion of the dispute in
the case law concerns the proper age at which a court should no long-
er defer to a breastfeeding mother as the proper arbiter of the appro-
priate age for weaning. In S. G. v. A. G., the Family Court of Dela-
ware juxtaposed these different interests in relation to a sibling set of
and half month old who was no longer breastfed justified termination of deference
to mother's determination of appropriate time length of visitation); Bowen v. Tho-
mas, 656 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (overturning a trial court order
for the mother to stop breastfeeding twins in order to facilitate workforce reentry
and eliminate need for spousal support and instead condition the end of such sup-
port on weaning); Ford v. Ford, 700 P.2d 65, 67 (Idaho 1985) ("In its initial custo-
dy award, the magistrate specifically underscored its temporary nature by providing
that the mother have custody 'for the present' because the child was breast-feeding.
The clear implication was that when the breast-feeding period terminated, the
award would be subject to modification."). But see H.O. v. G.T., No. CNO8-04254,
2010 WL 1199810, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 13, 2010) ("[T]he Court does not find
persuasive Mother's argument that she is still breast-feeding . . . Mother works
twelve-hour shifts on the weekends. No testimony was presented to this Court by a
nutritional expert or physician to indicate that L needs to be breast-fed. Moreover,
Mother has the ability to express her milk if she deems that nutritionally important
for L.").
n Since all custody disputes that involve breastfeeding (at least the ones surveyed) involve a
father who would like more visitation, or a mother who was denied exclusive custody de-
spite breastfeeding, the decision to award custody to the mother by definition defers to her
judgment. At least some courts, however, do so in passing, seemingly assuming without
question that this is the proper way to assign parenting duties. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, No.
2007-CA-001368-MR, 2008 WL 2152277, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
7 See, e.g., Widdel v. Kannegieter, 779 N.W.2d 79. 2009 WL 5125774, at *4 (Iowa App.
2009): Ford v. Ford, 700 P.2d 65. 67 (Idaho 1985).
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two children, aged three and seven months. 79 B, the infant, was both
nursing and had a medical condition affecting digestion, so the court
held that "the need to breastfeed weighs heavily in favor of Mother
retaining custody," but noted doctor testimony that the medical con-
dition would subside at twelve to fifteen months of age cautioning a
different result at such time. However, the three-year-old, A,
"[was] healthy," and not nursing. 8' Thus, the court granted visitation
for A immediately, and B the "first weekend after he turns one year
old." 82 The general court consensus is that a court may decide not to
take breastfeeding into account at one year, 83 conforming with the
American Association of Pediatrics recommendation, 84 though no
court has specifically cited to such a requirement or authority. Other
courts have set different standards, such as two years,85 or three
79 S.G. v. A.G., 2008 WL 5588866, at *1-2 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 28, 2008).
80 Id at *3.
8 Id. at *1. *3.
82 Id. at *5.
8' See, e.g., Beebe v. Elmenhorst. 2010 WL 3488832. *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010) (af-
firming district court decision to allow overnight visitation after one year in relation to Kan-
sas statute requiring support for nursing mothers, given ability to pump breastmilk and "ta-
pering off' of nursing); In re Love, 511 N.W.2d 648, 648-49 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)
(ordering reconsideration of custody at 11 months).
84 See Am. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 2 and accompanying text; WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Policard v. Policard, No. FA084010559, 2010 WL 797173, at *1 (Conn. Super. Feb. 5,
2010).
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years. 86 At least one treatise has acknowledged that court-led wean-
ing decisions based on legal factors may not be consistent with scien-
tific evidence about weaning or attachment, since forced weaning
may be more detrimental than any perceived harm from extended
nursing, and that attempts to equate nursing from the breast and via
expressed milk are often false and damaging.87 The inconsistency of
these determinations may also evidence judge intuition or gut feel-
ings about the "proper" age for weaning rather than any scientific
evidence. 88
The tender years doctrine does not explain all of the motiva-
tions for using breastfeeding as a factor in custody disputes, even
when custody is ultimately granted to the mother. 89 The cases that
86 Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, No. 48A02-0810-CV-921, 2009 VL 1749773, at *7 (Ind. Ct.
App. June 22, 2009).87 ANN M. HARALAMBIE. 1 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY. ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES 461
(3d. ed. 2009) ("Weaning may become an important issue in determining visitation, with
some courts creating schedules which interfere with breast-feeding and others ordering
mother's [sic] to wean their children to facilitate expanded visitation. Most knowledgeable
experts believe that children should be weaned on their own schedule, if at all possible.
Forced weaning (sometimes called 'traumatic weaning') may be counterproductive, making
the child who feels deprived for excessively long periods of time even more insistent on
nursing and more difficult to wean. Another consideration is the mother's physical comfort.
Even if the baby is satisfied with a bottle during visitation, the mother's breasts may become
painfully engorged if milk is not expressed by timely nursing. Breast pumps are not always
effective and may be uncomfortable or even painful to use.").
88 See Elizabeth N. Baldwin, Extended Breastfeeding and the Law, 20 BREASTFEEDING
ABSTRACTS 19 ( 2007) available at http://www.lli.org/ba/Feb0l.html (explaining factors that
may cause judges and other professionals to impose personal views on appropriate breast-
feeding in custody disputes).
89 See e.g., HARALAMBIE, supra note 87, at 461 (explaining the effect of weaning which
could influence motivation for using breastfeeding as a factor in custody disputes).
2012] BREASTFEEDING IN CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 651
allow custody most categorically, for example, often involve a medi-
cal need to breastfeed and the testimony of experts. 90 However, the
use of maternal choice to breastfeed to inform a decision to allow ex-
clusive custody until weaning is clearly in line with liberal notions of
the family that position women as the keeper of the home and the
best influence for children in need of a type of care that only a mother
can provide.91
B. Qualifications on Deference to Maternal Choice in Breastfeeding:
Specters of the Proper Role of Parenting
If granting custody to a breastfeeding mother evinces the on-
going influence of the tender years doctrine into modern family law,
limitations on that right may do so as well, albeit in a more compli-
cated fashion. At least two types of denials of custody for breastfeed-
ing mothers may be predicated on notions of fit maternal parenthood
in the tradition of the tender years doctrine: the policing of women
90 See Policard, 2010 WL 797173, at *1 ("There was a great deal of testimony over the issue
of physical custody of the youngest child. The wife, and mother of the child, is still breast
feeding the child at one and a half years of age. Due to the breast feeding, she seeks to pre-
vent the husband from having shared physical custody at this time. The husband asserts that
the child should be able to stay with him at this time. The court was provided with post-trial
memoranda which dealt with the issue of breastfeeding. After reading the memoranda and
hearing the testimony at the trial, the court has determined that the husband may have joint
physical custody of the minor child at such time as the child stops breastfeeding, or at the
child's second birthday whichever is sooner."); S.G. v. A.G., 2008 WL 5588866, at *3 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Oct. 28, 2008) (invoking the medical testimony of experts as evidence for a need to
breastfeed and adopting the youngest available age for reevaluation of custody).
91 See GROSSBERG, supra note 24.
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who breastfeed too long as "unfit mothers" and the invocation of the
stereotype of the mother who deliberately prolongs breastfeeding in
order to prevent joint custody. 92
First, courts sometimes invoke the notion of the vindictive
breastfeeding mother who unnecessarily prolongs the nursing rela-
tionship to justify sole custody, who denies visitation to the willing
father, or who lies about doing so. 93 In Buccini v. Sonara, for exam-
ple, a Florida Court of Appeals expressed skepticism that breastfeed-
ing was the actual motivation for the mother's desire to limit visita-
tion.94 The trial court had dismissed the father's claim that "he has
no way of knowing when or if the child is weaned because the moth-
er withholds information from him and it is unlikely she will affirma-
tively contact him," which the father claimed meant the mother could
"breastfeed until the child is a toddler which is well beyond the nor-
mal accepted breastfeeding period . .. denying access to the father."
The court of appeals found the failure to account for such claims an
92 See, e.g., Buccini v. Sonara. 989 So.2d 1288. 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008): Baldwin,
supra note 88, at 1.
9 See, e.g., Buccini. 989 So.2d at 1290; Jeanne Sager. Mom Uses Breastfeeding as Weapon
in Custody Battle. STROLLERDERBY (Apr. 28. 2009, 12:01 PM). available at
http://www.babble.com/CS/blogs/strollerderby/archive/2009/04/28/mom-uses-breastfeeding-
as-weapon-in-custody-battle.aspx (describing a court's order of forced weaning for a two-
year-old because the mother refused visitation of breastfeeding grounds).
94 Buccini, 989 So.2d at 1289 (stating that the father of a year-old child "has asked many
times for unsupervised visits" which were denied and that "[t]he only reason [the mother]
ever gave was that she is breastfeeding their son").
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abuse of discretion. 95 The court also noted that "[t]he father should
also be allowed to question the child's pediatrician to learn from
him/her whether the child is still breastfeeding or is able to take a
bottle so that he will know when to ask for mediation to adjust visita-
tion to include overnight visits." 96 The language used by this court
expresses a strong distrust of the breastfeeding mother's motivations,
and a desire that some objective force (i.e., a doctor) be available to
ensure the proper decision-making. 97
Second, and similarly, breastfeeding advocacy groups often
accuse family law courts of policing benign breastfeeding relation-
ships, seeking to destroy mutually beneficial relationships and the
best interest of the child because of fears of improper sexualization of
infants by mothers or a general discomfort with extended nursing. 98
This concern is largely based on two highly publicized cases in which
courts determined that extended breastfeeding constituted improper
95 Id. at 1290-91.96 Id. at 1290.
97 Id.
9' See Baldwin. supra note 88, at 1. ("Misinformation about breastfeeding affects everyone
in our society. including lawyers. judges, psychologists, and social workers. While there is
no harm in breastfeeding past infancy and allowing a child to wean naturally, many profes-
sionals in social service agencies and family law courts are quite shocked to learn just how
long a child may breastfeed. Lacking accurate information, these officials may overreact and
conclude that breastfeeding a child of two, three, or four is somehow improper."). Typically,
extended nursing is thought to include breastfeeding beyond the age of two, though some
courts have expressed frustration with mothers who attempt to do so beyond a year. Id.
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child sexualization or "troubling" attachment by the mother towards
her child. 99 Scientific evidence does not support either of these con-
clusions, since the global age for weaning is between 4-5 and almost
all scientific evidence supports such a conclusion. 00
These two tropes, at first glance, seem to fly in the face of the
tender years doctrine, focusing instead on competent fatherhood,
equally divided parenthood, and a willingness to indict improper pa-
renting by all parties.101 A closer look, however, indicates a consis-
tency with liberal and conservative notions of the family generally,
and tender years specifically. The tender years doctrine, after all,
concerned not merely the notion of woman as appropriate caregiver;
it also contemplated the necessity of "maternal instincts" for young
children.102 In situations where the mother was not an appropriate
maternal influence, either because of unfitness or because of the need
for a masculine influence, courts did not hesitate to transfer proper
custody back to the father as head of household and purveyor of mas-
99 Momjian, supra note 60, at 138. (citing Shunk v. Walker, 589 A.2d 1303 (Md. Ct. App.
1991) and Friendshuh v. Headlough, 504 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1993).
100 Baldwin, supra note 88, at 2.
101 Buccini v. Sonara, 989 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Baldwin, supra note
88. at 1.
102 See GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 249.
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culinity.103 Court standards for fitness also "indicated a wariness
about maternal fitness that accompanied all legal extensions of mar-
ried women's sphere."1 04 In that sense, judicial standards of the "rea-
sonable woman" are in line with policing motherhood to only include
appropriately maternal actions.105 Inappropriately maternal actions,
such as breastfeeding as related to sexuality or using a child for one's
own gain, abrogate the availability of the tender years doctrine.106
These standards not only coincide with a court's desire to find the
"best interest of the child" in any given case, but also may be read as
reinforcing acceptable standards for maternal parenting and relation
between mother and child, especially given the misalignment be-
tween scientific fact and court inquiry. 107
III. BREASTFEEDING AS JUSTIFICATION FOR REVOCATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS: IMPROPER MATERNAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE
DISPROPORTIONATE REACH OF FAMILY LAW
Part II discussed the ways in which breastfeeding determina-
tions in custody disputes inform and reinforce the tender years doc-
trine. This Part investigates a slightly different application: the ways
103 id.
104 id.
105 id.
106 1d. at 248.
107 See GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 249.
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in which breastfeeding serves as evidence for and a marker of impro-
per parental relationships indicating a failure of the privatization of
dependency. It argues that attempts to revoke custody based on
breastfeeding failures may fit the concept of the privatization of de-
pendency and the failure of some families to meet societal standards
under the liberal and conservative definition of family. In some oth-
ers, evidence of breastfeeding while intoxicated or while on drugs
serves as prima facie evidence of parental incompetence worthy of
state intervention or termination of parental rights.108 In others, the
failure to supplement with infant formula or successfully breastfeed
manifests as parental incompetence that can amount to criminal be-
havior.109 In both scenarios, however, scrutiny falls disproportionate-
ly on poor women or fails to invoke evidence that the conduct alleged
is harmful for breastfeeding infants.
Parental autonomy in the context of raising an infant includes
the right to breastfeed.110 This deferential standard, however, does
not extend to mothers who use drugs or alcohol while breastfeed-
108 In re P.B.. No. B224012. 2010 WL 361083. at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20. 2010): In re
Oscar S. v. Maria G.. No. D039212. 2002 WL 1420424. at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 1. 2002).
109 In re S.L.A., 223 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
110 Suzanne D'Amico, 'Inherently' Female Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A Gender-
Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 855, 860 (2001) ("Thus, under the Dike court's rea-
soning, the mother has a constitutional right to breastfeed free from undue state interference;
however, this unique right imposes unique duties. Generally, the breastfeeding mother is the
exclusive provider of nourishment to her child.").
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ing-drug or alcohol use while breastfeeding is often taken as un-
questionable evidence of parenting worthy of state intervention,
without discussion of the effects of such behavior."' In addition, the
decision to exclusively breastfeed is often subject to medical over-
sight and intervention.112 In one famous New York case, for exam-
ple, a nineteen-year-old welfare recipient named Tabitha Walrond
was charged with reckless homicide for failure to feed her son ade-
quately and causing his death through malnutrition.113
To be sure, these cases provide a more complicated picture of
the privatization of dependency than routine home searches for social
welfare recipients114 or even of drug-addicted pregnant women.115
For one thing, there may be other issues at play. In In re S.L.A., for
1 In re P.B., 2010 WL at *1 ("Mother admitted to regularly using marijuana, including
while she was breastfeeding P., but she said she had a prescription for it"); In the Matter of
S. L.A., 223 S.W.3d at 300 (revoking custody because the mother, among other things, stored
breast milk in a trailer that was also used as a methamphetamine lab and admitted to drug
use during pregnancy and while nursing).
112 See generally ELLEN CHETWYND, JUDITH L. GUTOWSKI, & MARSHA WALKER,
UNITED STATES LACTATION CONSULTANT ASSOCIATION, CONTAINING HEALTH
CARE COSTS HELP IN PLAIN SIGHT. INTERNATIONAL BOARD CERTIFIED LACTATION
CONSULTANTS: ALLIED HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION
1-20 (2010) available at
http://www.uslca.org/documents/White%/o20Paper/ReimbursementWhite Paper.pd
f.
113 Mary Romero, The Foundational Myths of Reroductive Labor Under Capitalism: A Call
for Brave New Families or Brave New Villages?, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 177,
177 (1999) (describing the situation).
114 See Hasday, supra note 24, at 301.
... Dorothy E. Roberts. Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equali-
ty, and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419. 1421 (1991).
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example, the mother was running a methamphetamine lab out of her
trailer and had been incarcerated continuously.11 6 In In re P.B., the
mother had delusions and hospital records that would seem to inter-
fere with her ability to care for a child." 7 This scrutiny may indicate
that more parental decision-making ought to be subject to state inter-
vention, rather than less.
However, such cases also highlight the relationship between
the state, assumptions of proper motherhood, and the gap between
surveillance by the state on one hand and the provision of adequate
services on the other. For drug addicted mothers, little investigation
into the legal status of their drug use or its effects on development is
even mentioned." 8 In the case of Tabitha Walrond,
The district attorney's charges are based on the assumptions surrounding the
naturalness of motherhood-namely. breast-feeding and caring for babies. Be-
cause she had breast reduction surgery, Walrond was biologically unable to
116 223 S.W.3d at 297 98.
''7 2010 WL 3621083 at *2-*3.
118 See id at *6-7 (discussing advocacy of drug legalization as evidence of drug addiction,
and discounting allegations that the marijuana used was done so legally); see also Kelly Bo-
nyata, Breastfeeding and Mariuana, KELLYMOM,
http://kellymom.com/health/lifestyle/marijuana.html (last modified May 18, 2010) (stating
"[t]he effect of marijuana use on infants via breastfeeding has not been extensively studied.
Some negative effects, such as sleepiness, slow weight gain, higher SIDS rates, and second-
hand smoke risks, have been reported, though "no significant differences were found in
terms of age at weaning. growth. and mental or motor development." In the case of me-
thamphetamines, little study has been done on actual effects, though methamphetamines do
excrete into the milk supply and are contraindicated. See Meth Use Can Affect Mother's
Breast Milk, MT. DEP'T OF PUB. HEATH & HUM. SERVS., available at
http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/newsevents/newsreleases2004/september/methuseandbreastmilk.s
html (Sept. 29. 2004) (noting that meth may be cut with other drugs, causing damage, and
that breastfeeding should not occur for 24 hours after ingestion of methamphetamines).
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successfully breast-feed her baby. She lacked the assumed "natural" knowledge
of assessing the baby's health, and no public support was provided to assist her.
Medical experts agree that routine pediatric checkups would have identified the
problem, but Medicare declined to enroll Tyler despite Walrond's numerous at-
tempts, delaying his enrollment until months after his death. In addition. no one
ever informed Walrond that her breast reduction surgery greatly increased her
risk for difficulties in breast-feeding. Even though Walrond received inade-
quate prenatal and postpartum health care, as well as being denied public
access to health cjre for her baby. the state charged her as being responsible for
the baby's death.
Breastfeeding custody disputes in the case of failed breastfeeding and
infant safety may thus invoke both the tender years doctrine and no-
tions of parental autonomy.120 Increased scrutiny is combined with a
lack of real support services and a focus on punishment for women
when maternal decisions go awry.
IV. REJECTING COMMON LAW COVERTURE, THE TENDER YEARS
DOCTRINE, AND DISPROPORTIONATE INTRUSION INTO THE LIVES OF POOR
WOMEN IN THE CASE OF BREASTIFEEDING MOTHERS
Current family law's continued reliance on the tender years
doctrine and liberal and conservative notions of maternal behavior
described in Parts II and III should be cause for alarm. After all,
these doctrines have been discredited as violating equal protection,
based on inaccurate stereotypes of the proper role of women, and un-
necessarily intrusive into the lives of poor women. 121 The elimina-
119 Romero, supra note 113, at 177-78.
120 Moran v. Moran. 612 A.2d 1075. 1076 (1992).
121 See Selfridge, supra note 61, at 166-68.
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tion of such justifications from legal decision-making may be thus
desirable.
However, this desire collides with scientific evidence of the
superiority of exclusive breastfeeding as the normal and optimal food
for infants for at least six months, and AAP recommendations that
weaning should be natural, child-led, and not attempted until desired
by both mother and child.122 What does this mean for the rule in cus-
tody disputes involving breastfeeding? The assumption of breast-
feeding as the norm for human infants may support a number of con-
clusions. It counsels that judges should be apprised of current
research and findings into the benefits of facilitating breastfeeding by
mothers who wish to do so. It means that more research should be
done into the adequacy of expressed milk as an adequate substitute
for direct feeding. Invocation of stereotypes about vindictive women
and inappropriate relationships should be interrogated as based on
outdated caricatures of female behavior.
A number of family law scholars, including those at the
American Law Institute, advocate the use of a "primary caretaker
presumption" in custody disputes, which would allocate "custodial
122 See generally Introduction; see also HARALAMBIE, supra note 87, at 664: supra note 5
(describing public health savings and benefits).
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responsibility in rough proportion to the share of responsibility the
parent assumed before the divorce or the circumstances giving rise to
the custody action." 123 In the case of breastfeeding, this type of rule
might better approximate the time spent nursing as an approximation
for determining custody in a way that does not require a reliance on
tender years or feminine domesticity. However, in applying such a
rule courts would need to address time allocation concerns: even if a
breastfeeding mother receives 80% of custody time to allocate for the
time spent breastfeeding, nursing on-demand may require that the
20% allocated to the other parent not take place continuously, or
overnight, or far from the nursing mother during lunch time.
Some critics argue that deferring to women as primary custo-
dians of children because of their biological ability to breastfeed may
compound the gendering of the family tradition.124 If custody for
breastfeeding mothers is not accompanied by adequate child support,
equal pay, and lactaction support, challenges to liberal and conserva-
tive conceptualizations of family and the notion of separate spheres
123 Rachel M. Colancecco, A Flexible Solution to a Knotty Problem: The Best Interests of the
Child Standard in Relocation Disputes, I DREXEL L. REV. 573, 597 (2009); see also Eliza-
beth Barker Brandt, Concerns at the Margins ofSupervised Access to Children, 9 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 201, 214 (2007) (describing the standard and its failure to be adopted by any
state legislature).
124 See supra Part 11.
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may be exacerbated rather than eliminated.125 Some scholars go so
far as to claim that any preference for breastfeeding relationships is
sex-biased and ignores that any nurture benefits can be gained by ei-
ther parent through mechanisms other than breastfeeding.126 These
criticisms are reasonable, and caution against a robust presumption of
women-as-breastfeeders. However, the benefits of breastfeeding, and
the need to support it on a public health level mean that there is value
in attempting to split these types of custody disputes from their doc-
trinal roots, even if such a split can only be done imperfectly. A pre-
sumption of primary custody rule may be one way to do so, and
should be considered.
125 OKIN, supra note 36. at 17 (discussing how increased single parenting as a result of di-
vorce and subsequent impoverishment cuts against advancements for women in the public
sphere and how increases in equality for women may simultaneously help outcomes for
children).
126 Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on Ao-Fault Divorce and its Af-
termath. 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1. 84 (1987) ("[B]reast-feeding is no longer universal in human
society, and even one of the most ardent advocates of the child's right to the continuous care
of an adult during its early years recognizes that the essential bond of intimacy can be
created by the 'wisdom' of mothers in the absence of breast-feeding. If that is so. then
"wise" fathers, as well, can and do form intimate bonds with infants growing out of a re-
peated pattern of daily interaction and care. A strategy for childrearing that will bind both
fathers and mothers to the nurturance of the child seems better suited to its growth and de-
velopment under modern conditions in which the child's natal family is less frequently the
unit in which it reaches maturity."). But ef GROSSBERG, supra note 24, at 254 (discussing
rejection of such equal protection claims by men).
